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1 Introduction
Banks play a crucial role in modern economies due to their ability to transform
liquid deposits from the liability side of their balance sheets into loans as illiquid
assets on the asset side. Doing this, they create liquidity for both depositors and
borrowers who in turn can then realize their most desired consumption or investment
plans, respectively (cf. Diamond, Rajan, 2001). As is well–known, this kind of
transformation provided by banks is a source of risks of which credit risk — the risk
of borrower default — is probably the most important one.
Some recent theoretical work has focused on the impact of risk, such as credit risk
or market risk, on bank behavior in markets for deposits and loans and in markets
for hedging instruments (see e.g. Wong, 1997, Wahl, Broll, 2000). In these papers
the so–called industrial organization approach to banking (Freixas, Rochet, 1997, ch.
3) is extended to an analysis under uncertainty, using a von–Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function to represent a bank management’s attitude towards risk in general
and risk aversion in particular. A standard result derived in this framework is the
following: Banks alter their decisions in the presence of uncertainty in order to
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reduce the exposure to risk (see e.g. Wahl, Broll, 2000). Furthermore it can be
shown that risk management, i.e., using derivatives such as futures and swaps for
hedging purposes, is beneficial. In some circumstances hedging permits banks to
separate their production and risk management decisions. As a result, they need
not care about risk when making production decision, i.e., buying deposits and
selling loans, and are able to fully transfer their risk to derivatives markets. In the
literature these results are labelled separation property and full hedge theorem.
However, this theoretical work in banking is subject to criticism put forward in
a more general context by Froot et al. (1993) who pointed out that the hedging
literature does not really explain why firms hedge against risk. From the existing
literature the authors mention risk aversion of managers, a convex tax function, the
cost of financial distress and capital market imperfections as explanations for hedg-
ing (see Froot et al., 1993, for references). These arguments for active corporate risk
management seem applicable to the banking industry, but they are affected by the
same logical weaknesses in this sector. For example, managers of a bank implicitly
hold a relatively large stake of their wealth in the banking firm causing a high cor-
relation between their personal wealth and the bank’s wealth. Compared to outside
stockholders their ability to diversify their claims is limited, and they will there-
fore prefer hedging to reduce the variance of the bank’s value. The validity of this
reasoning clearly hinges upon the assumption that bank managers face prohibitive
costs of hedging for their own accounts (cf. Froot et. al, 1993) which may appear
questionable in today’s world of highly developed capital markets.
In order to establish a solid argument for risk averse behavior Froot et al. (1993)
start out from an observed capital market imperfection, namely that externally
obtained funds are more expensive than funds generated internally. They show that
the optimal hedging strategy of a firm, and the fact that it uses hedging in the first
place, depend upon the nature of its investment and financing opportunities. In
Froot, Stein (1998) they provide an application where a per se risk neutral decision
maker exhibits endogenous risk averse behavior. The authors call this ”effective”
risk aversion. We will speak of ” as if” risk aversion.
Returning to the banking industry, we notice that the question of whether or
not a bank can be considered risk averse also has implications for the debate about
banking regulation. Given that the overall aim of regulating banks is ”to improve
the safety and soundness in the financial system” (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2001b, p. 1), one can argue that a bank’s risk aversion works exactly
in this direction and therefore supports the regulator’s objective. One could then
wonder whether credit risk yields an independent motive for regulation or whether
the prime arguments for regulating banks are systemic risk and ”the inability of
depositors to monitor banks” (Santos, 2000, p. 5).
Against this background, the purpose of our paper is the following: We want to
introduce capital adequacy regulation as an important factor to explain risk averse
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behavior of banks and to examine how this regulation interacts with the hedging
motive of a bank. To achieve this, we use a microeconomic model of a bank with
credit risk to show that capital adequacy regulation of the kind of both the existing
Basel Capital Accord and the proposed New Basel Capital Accord (often labelled
”Basel II”) makes a per se risk neutral bank behave as if it were risk averse. This
effect arises because the regulation relates equity capital to the volume of the risky
asset and its risk. Our analysis is clearly related to Froot et al. (1993), since our
results are also driven by the assumption that there are funds obtainable at different
prices. Furthermore we show that in this context it is beneficial for the bank to
engage in risk management — i.e., hedging — only if the regulatory rules treat
hedging as risk reducing thereby lowering capital requirements. Such a treatment
of hedging is part of the Basel II proposal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
basic model and analyze bank behavior in the absence of regulation. In section 3 we
introduce a capital adequacy regulation of the kind proposed for the Basel Capital
Accord type into the model and compare the results to those of section 3. Some
comparative–static results are presented. In section 4 we consider the opportunity
to hedge the bank’s risk and develop conditions for hedging being beneficial. Section
5 concludes.
2 Base model without regulation
To model bank behavior we apply the industrial organization approach to banking
(cf. Freixas, Rochet, 1997, ch. 3), augmented by uncertainty of the credit risk type.
Analyses of risk within this framework were also performed e.g. by Zarruk, Madura
(1992), Wong (1997) and Wahl, Broll (2000). More specifically, we consider a one
period setting with a large banking firm which enjoys market power in both the
deposit and loan markets.1
Loans L and deposits D are assumed to be homogenous. The decisions on loans
and deposits are made via the setting of loan and deposit rates rL and rD, re-
spectively, at the beginning of the period. The bank faces a loan demand function
L = L(rL) with L
′(rL) < 0 and L′′(rL) < 0 and a deposit supply functionD = D(rD)
with D′(rD) > 0 and D′′(rD) < 0. In other words, demand for loans is assumed to
be a concave function, and the supply of deposits (D(rD)) is assumed to be concave,
1Notice that this (Monti–Klein) model of a monopolistic bank is a natural starting point for an
analysis of oligopolistic banking industries which we address in other work.
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too.2
The operational cost of financial intermediation is described by a cost function
depending on the volumes of deposits and loans: C = C(D,L) with ∂C(D,L)/∂D =
CD(D,L) > 0, ∂C(D,L)/∂L = CL(D,L) > 0, ∂
2C(D,L)/∂D2 = CDD(D,L) > 0,
∂2C(D,L)/∂L2 = CLL(D,L) > 0 and ∂
2C(D,L)/(∂D∂L) = ∂2C(D,L)/(∂L∂D) =
CDL(D,L) = 0. I.e., we assume the cost function to be convex in loans and deposits
and do not consider any economies or diseconomies of scope. In section 5 we briefly
comment on changes to be made if we move away from this benchmark case.
The balance sheet constraint of the bank can now be written as
L+M = D +K (1)
where K is the amount of equity held by the bank and M the amount of excess
(M > 0 when L < D + K) or shortage (M < 0 when L > D + K) in liabilities
which can be lent or borrowed at a risk free interest rate r > 0. If we interpret the
bank under consideration as one of large number of local monopolists, this lending
or borrowing would occur in a competitive interbank market for funds. Otherwise,
r could be interpreted as interest rate in an international market for funds or as
interest rate controlled by the central bank. All of these interpretations can be
found in the banking literature. Since for our analysis it does not matter which one
we use, we follow the majority of the literature and speak of a competitive interbank
market. Finally, rK > 0 denotes the cost of holding or extending equity.
The bank faces credit risk as a unique source of risk, i.e., we abstract from the
interaction of different types of risk and focus on credit risk as the most important
one in the traditional business of financial intermediation. For modeling credit risk
we follow the lead of Wong (1997): Let the random variable θ˜ ∈ [0, 1] denote the
proportion of loans non–performing at the end of the period. A loan is defined as
non–performing, if the borrower fully defaults on payment of interest and repayment
of principal. Such non–performing loans have to be written off completely at the
end of the period.3
With this information the random profit of the bank can be written as
Π˜ = (1− θ˜)rLL(rL)− θ˜L(rL) + rM − rDD(rD)− rKK − C(D,L). (2)
where a ”˜” here and henceforth denotes a random variable. By substituting for
M in (2) from the balance sheet constraint (1) the bank’s random profit can be
2These concavity assumptions are made to simplify the exposition of our argument. They could
be replaced by less restrictive conditions to ensure the concavity of the bank’s objective function
without changing the qualitative nature of our results.
3Our approach could similarly used to examine the case of borrowers only defaulting on interest
payments or other forms of partial default.
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rewritten as
Π˜ = (rL − r)L(rL)− θ˜(1 + rL)L(rL) + (r − rD)D(rD) + (r − rK)K − C(D,L). (3)
Since we later want to show how risk averse behavior results from the interplay
of uncertainty and capital adequacy regulation, we assume at this point that the
bank is risk neutral, i.e., it simply maximizes its expected profit by simultaneously
choosing rD and rL at the beginning of the period:
max
rD,rL
E(Π˜) (4)
where E is the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution of
θ˜ and Π˜ is given by equation (3).
The first–order necessary conditions for (4) are given by
−D(rD)
D′(rD)
− rD + r − CD(D,L) = 0 (5)
(1− θ¯)
(
L(rL)
L′(rL)
+ rL
)
− (r + θ¯)− CL(D,L) = 0 (6)
where θ¯ = E(θ˜). Equation (5) determines the optimal deposit rate, whereas equation
(6) determines the optimal loan rate. The two interest rates can be set independently
because of two reasons. First, our assumption of a zero cross–derivative CDL(D,L) =
CLD(D,L) = 0 implies that the optimal deposit rate is not influenced by the loan
rate via the cost of intermediation and vice versa. Second, the existence of the
competitive interbank market separates the two sides of the balance sheet. There
is no need to care about the liability side when choosing the amount of loans (via
the loan rate) and vice versa. Credit risk has no impact on behavior on the deposit
market and the risk neutral bank acts in the loan market as if the default rate were
certain at the expected value E(θ˜).
As for the amount of equity K we can say the following: Depending on the sign
of r−rK holding more equity can be beneficial for the bank or not. When r−rK > 0
every additional unit of equity capital increases the expected profit. In this situation
the bank holds as much equity as possible. In the case of r−rK < 0 a higher amount
of equity lowers the expected profit. Then the bank tries to get along without any
equity.
3 Capital adequacy regulation
We now introduce capital adequacy regulation into the model. Our bank is required
to hold a minimum level of equity depending on the amount of loans and their
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riskiness. More specifically, this means
K ≥ K(δL(rL)) with K ′(δL(rL)) > 0 and δ > 0. (7)
The regulatory instrument δ adds weight to the volume of loans outstanding. δ can
be made dependent on the risk of loans which we will consider in more detail later.
This kind of regulation considered in the model is a stylized representation of the
regulatory approach for credit risk both under the existing Basel Capital Accord and
under the proposed New Basel Capital Accord (cf. Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2001a, paragraphs 68-76).
Before conducting our formal analysis, it is necessary to take a second look at
the cost of capital rK . The consensus in the literature is that the cost of capital
has to be above the riskless rate of return in the market. Agency costs are probably
the most important explanation for this statement. Such agency costs arise because
of asymmetric information between the bank’s management and the owners of its
equity capital (see Jensen, Meckling, 1976, and Myers, Majluf, 1984, for details). In
other words, due to agency costs r < rK or r − rK < 0. In this case an increase
of equity K reduces expected profit as we just mentioned in the previous section.
Therefore, given the volume of loans and the level of credit risk the bank is interested
in employing the lowest level of equity possible. For that reason the regulatory
constraint (7) can be considered as binding in the sequel.
The bank is again assumed to maximize its expected profit (4) with respect to
the deposit rate and the loan rate, where Π˜ is now given by
Π˜ = (rL − r)L(rL) − θ˜(1 + rL)L(rL) + (r − rD)D(rD)
+ (r − rK)K(δL(rL))− C(D,L). (8)
The first–order necessary conditions are
−D(rD)
D′(rD)
− rD + r − CD(D,L) = 0 (9)
(1− θ¯)
(
L(rL)
L′(rL)
+ rL
)
− (r + θ¯)− CL(D,L) + (r − rK)K ′(δL(rL)) = 0. (10)
As in the previous section decisions about deposit and loan rates can be separated.
Therefore, equation (9) defines the optimal deposit rate and equation (10) defines
the optimal loan rate of the model with regulation.
Comparing the first–order conditions (9) and (10) to the corresponding condi-
tions (5) and (6) from the model without capital adequacy regulation reveals the
equivalence between (5) and (9), i.e., the conditions for the deposit rate. Thus the
introduction of the capital adequacy regulation does not influence the bank’s deposit
rate decision. Invoking the separation result this implies rD = r
R
D, where r
R
D denotes
the optimal deposit rate under regulation. However, a comparison of equations (6)
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and (10) shows that the first–order conditions for the optimal loan rate differ by
(r − rK)K ′(δL(rL)) which is negative due to our assumptions on regulation and on
the cost of equity capital. Therefore the loan rate unambiguously increases as a
result of the introduction of the regulation, i.e., rL < r
R
L .
We can thus state our first proposition:
Proposition 1 Due to the introduction of capital adequacy regulation the optimal
loan rate increases and the optimal deposit rate remains unaffected. In consequence
the level of loans decreases with regulation.
Proof: To prove the proposition we adopt a similar proof from Wahl, Broll
(2000). Due to (r − rK)K ′(δL(rL)) < 0 condition (10) implies
(1− θ¯)
(
L(rRL )
L′(rRL )
+ rRL
)
− (r + θ¯)− CL(D,L(rRL )) > 0.
in the optimum. Using this expression and condition (6) we get
(1− θ¯)(rRL − rL) > (1− θ¯)
(
L(rL)
L′(rL)
− L(r
R
L )
L′(rRL )
)
− (CL(D,L(rL))− CL(D,L(rRL ))) .
Assume that the loan rate does not rise as a result of regulation (rRL ≤ rL). Due
to the assumptions about L(rL) and C(D,L) it is easy to see that in the present
case 1− θ¯ > 0, L(rRL ) ≥ L(rL), L′(rRL ) ≥ L′(rL) and CL(D,L(rRL )) ≥ CL(D,L(rL)).
Considering L′(rL) < 0 the above equation yields rRL − rL > 0 which contradicts the
assumption of rRL ≤ rL. Thus the loan rate rises due to the regulation.
The intuitive reason for this result is the following: Introducing capital adequacy
regulation creates a link between both sides of the bank’s balance sheet. A higher
level of rL lowers the volume of loans and thereby reduces the capital requirement
and with it the costs of equity capital. This can easily be seen from (8).
But as mentioned before the overall aim of capital adequacy regulation under
the Basel Accord is to improve the safety of the banking system. The existence of
regulation should therefore reduce the bank’s exposure to risk. As a consequence
even a risk neutral bank should be sensitive to risk, if there is capital adequacy
regulation. To investigate whether this holds true we slightly modify our model.
We follow Sandmo (1971) and replace θ˜ by γ˜ = sθ˜ + (1 − s)θ¯. The parameter s is
initially set to one. Changes in s shift risk to a higher level, if s > 1, or to a lower
level, if s < 1, leaving the expected proportion of non–performing loans unchanged,
i.e., E(γ˜) = E(θ˜) = θ¯. In other words, we employ a mean preserving spread of the
probability distribution of credit risk. Substituting γ˜ for θ˜ yields the same first–order
conditions for deposit rates, whereas in the conditions for loan rates θ˜ is replaced
by sθ˜ + (1− s)θ¯.
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It is now easy to see that without capital adequacy regulation there is no influence
of s on the optimal values of rD and rL, i.e., maximization of the expected profit
is not affected by a mean preserving spread. The same result holds true for the
deposit rate in the case of regulation. Since the mean preserving spread does not
not change the first–order condition (9), the optimal deposit rate under regulation
is not affected by a change in risk in the sense of a mean preserving spread. To
investigate the impact of a change in risk on the loan rate under regulation (rRL ) we
apply the implicit function theorem to (10) to get
drRL
ds
|s=1= −
(
∂2E(Π˜)
∂rL∂s
)
·
(
∂2E(Π˜)
(∂rL)2
)−1
. (11)
Differentiating (10) with respect to rL and applying the envelope theorem yields for
the denominator of this expression
∂2E(Π˜)
(∂rL)2
= 2(1− θ¯)L′(rL) + (r − rK)K ′′(δL(rL))(δL′(rL))2 − CLL(D,L)(L′(rL))2
which is negative as long as the regulation function is not concave in weighted loans,
i.e., K ′′(δL(rL)) ≥ 0. This convexity of the regulatory rule which also covers the case
of a linear function holds both for the existing and the New Basel Capital Accord
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervion, 2001b, p. 3).
Differentiating (10) with respect to s yields
∂2E(Π˜)
∂rL∂s
= (r − rK)L′(rL)(K ′′(δL(rL))δL(rL) +K ′(δL(rL)))dδ
ds
.
for the numerator. Using K ′′(δL(rL)) ≥ 0 again the sign of this expression depends
solely on the sign of dδ/ds. Thus we get
∂2E(Π˜)
∂rL∂s
>
=
<
0 ⇔ dδ
ds
>
=
<
0.
Therefore the reaction of the loan rate to a change in credit risk is given by
drRL
ds
|s=1
>
=
<
0 ⇔ dδ
ds
>
=
<
0. (12)
As a result we can now state the following
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Proposition 2 The optimal loan rate under capital adequacy regulation is affected
by a mean preserving spread of credit risk if and only if dδ
ds
6= 0. The deposit rate
remains unaffected by changes in credit risk.
Notice that under the existing Basel Capital Accord we have a positive relationship
between s and δ implying a positive impact of risk on the interest rate on loans. For
example, loans to central governments have a weight of δ = 0, whereas corporate
loans carry a weight of δ = 1.4 The proposal for the New Basel Capital Accord
contains a more differentiated weighting scheme. For example, under the new stan-
dardised approach corporate loans can have risk weights of δ = 0.2, δ = 0.5, δ = 1.0
or δ = 1.5. To further analyze this proposition, we first differentiate the expected
profit under regulation (8) with respect to s evaluated at the initial value of s = 1.
Applying the envelope theorem yields
dE(Π˜)
ds
|s=1= (r − rK)K ′(δL(rL))L(rL)dδ
ds
. (13)
Again, given the above assumptions, the sign of (13) solely depends on the sign of
dδ/ds:
dE(Π˜)
ds
|s=1
<
=
>
0 ⇔ dδ
ds
>
=
<
0. (14)
From (13) we can observe an income effect due to regulation which is positive when
δ increases in s and negative when δ decreases in s. In the case of δ independent
from s this income effect disappears. The intuition is quite simple. Since raising
and holding equity is costly — recall r − rK < 0 — a higher required amount of
equity because of a higher level of weighted loans increases the bank’s costs and
thus lowers expected profit. For a lower level of weighted loans the opposite is true.
Given any amount of loans, changes in the level of weighted loans can only be caused
by changes in δ. Thus when δ depends on risk s, a change in risk causes δ to change
and in this way alters the level of weighted loans, creating regulatory costs for the
bank. Therefore it is immediately clear that for the capital adequacy regulation
to work it is necessary for δ to increase when s increases and to decrease when s
decreases, i.e., dδ/ds > 0. But this is precisely what existing and future banking
regulation under the Basel Capital Accord requires (see e.g. Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2001b).
Moreover it is possible to derive a second insight from (13) and (14) above. Using
a capital adequacy regulation of the Basel type, there is a negative relationship
4In the framework of our model, capital adequacy regulation operates with a linear function
K(δl) = 0.08δ L.
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between the risk parameter s and the bank’s objective function E(Π˜). In other
words, the increase in risk s lowers the expected profit of the bank all other things
being equal. As a result, a risk neutral bank choosing from prospects offering the
same expected share of nonperforming loans will always acting prefer the one with
the lowest level of risk. In fact, due to the regulation the bank acts as if it were
risk averse. Remember that a risk averse agent chooses a prospect with the lower
risk from a pair of profit distributions with identical means (see Rothschild, Stiglitz,
1970). Thus we can state the following
Proposition 3 A risk neutral bank maximizing its expected profit is induced by
capital adequacy regulation of the Basel type (i.e., dδ
ds
> 0) to behave as if it were
risk averse.
So we find a new interpretation of capital adequacy regulation. It creates in the
context of risk neutral, expected profit maximizing banks an implicitly risk averse
behavior. This arises because of the ability of the regulation to link the two sides of
the balance sheet and in this way impose costs on the banks.
This result is in the spirit of recent analyses in the literature on corporate finance
and risk management. Froot et al. (1993) and Froot, Stein (1998) show that firms
exhibit implicitly risk averse behavior when there exists an investment opportunity
which can only be financed by a combination of costly equity and internal funds
originating from uncertain revenues from previous investments. They argue that a
random decrease in internal funds implies a need for more equity, thereby ceteris
paribus increasing costs and decreasing profit. A risk neutral firm anticipating this
possibility will be induced to invest less than in the case with no such uncertainty.
4 Incentives for risk management
Risk management can be defined as ”the discipline of identifying risks [. . . ], assessing
their potential impact on critical performance measures, and employing direct and
indirect means for either reducing the exposure of underlying economic activities to
these risks or shifting some of the exposure to others” (Lessard, 1995, p. 5). Because
of the growing importance of financial markets to trade financial risk, we focus on
the latter part of the above definition. Thus risk management will be considered as
a bank’s active risk shifting policy using financial markets for derivatives.
Since credit risk is the only source of risk in our model, we consider a market for
credit derivatives. More specifically, we assume the existence of a market for total
return swaps which can be bought or sold by the bank to the amount of H at the
beginning of the period. The market is assumed to be unbiased. The swap contracts
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mature at the end of the period. The bank is obliged to pay to the contracting party
the amount of (1− θ˜)rL− θ˜ upon maturity per unit issued. In return the bank gets
a riskless repayment from its counterpart to the amount of (1 − θ¯)rL − θ¯ per unit
of total return swap issued due to the unbiasedness of the market. Thus the total
return swaps create a revenue of H(rL+1)(θ˜− θ¯). Notice that H is not constrained.
Thus at H > 0 the bank would sell swap contracts, whereas at H < 0 it would be a
buyer of total return swaps. Notice further that as off-balance activities the swaps
do not alter the balance sheet constraint (1).
The random profit of the bank with hedging and under capital adequacy regula-
tion can now be written as
Π˜ = (rL − r)L(rL) − θ˜(1 + rL)L(rL) + (r − rD)D(rD)
+ (r − rK)K − C(D,L) +H(1 + rL)(θ˜ − θ¯). (15)
We again consider capital adequacy regulation of the type examined in the previous
section, i.e., K = K(δL(rL)) with rK > r. The bank calculates
max
rD,rL,H
E(Π˜) (16)
where Π˜ is given by equation (15) above.
The first–order necessary conditions for problem (16) are
−D(rD)
D′(rD)
− rD + r − CD(D,L) = 0 (17)
(1− θ¯)
(
L(rL)
L′(rL)
+ rL
)
−(r + θ¯)− CL(D,L) + (r − rK)K ′(δL(rL))δ = 0 (18)
(rL + 1)(θ¯ − θ¯) = 0. (19)
Notice that the first–order conditions for the optimal levels of deposit and loan rates
(17) and (18) are the same as the first–order conditions under regulation without
hedging (9) and (10) in the previous section. Equation (19) — the first–order con-
dition for the optimal level of hedging – holds for all values of rD, rL and H. For
that reason the bank is indifferent between all possible hedging volumes. In fact,
due to the unbiasedness of the market for total return swaps hedging adds no value
to the bank’s objective function in this model.
However, we have not yet taken into account that according to the New Basel
Capital Accord hedging operations with credit derivatives are explicitly acknowl-
edged as reducing the bank’s risk, thereby lowering its capital requirement (see
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001a, paragraphs 88-90). To integrate
this into our model of banking under capital adequacy regulation, we modify the
regulatory condition (7)in the following way:
K ≥ K(δf(L(rL)−H)) with K ′(δf(L(rL)−H)) > 0. (20)
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The function f(L(rL) − H) is used to correct the volume of loans outstanding L
for the quantity of credit derivatives sold H. We will refer to the value of this
function as regulatory loans. To motivate this function, we refer the reader to the
proposal for a New Basel Capital Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision,2001a, paragraph 90). This proposal implies the following properties of f :
For every realization of L(rL) − H the function takes a non–negative value, i.e.,
f(L(rL)−H) ≥ 0 which rules out negative values of regulatory loans. Furthermore
f ′(L(rL) − H) > 0 ⇔ L > H and f ′(L(rL) − H) < 0 ⇔ L < H which means
that the higher absolute value of the difference L(rL)−H, the higher the regulatory
loan volume. Finally, f ′(0) = 0. In other words, at L(rL) = H there is a unique
minimum in the volume of regulatory loans. This, in fact, is in the interest of the
regulator. To see this, we transform (15) into
Π˜ = (rL − r)L(rL) − θ˜(rL + 1)(L(rL)−H)
+ (r − rD)D(rD) + (r − rK)K − C(D,L) +H(rL + 1)θ¯.
As can be seen easily from this equation, for L(rL) = H the influence of the random
variable disappears and the bank’s profit is no longer uncertain. This is why it is
rational for the regulator to set the lowest capital requirement to the point L(rL) =
H. In the literature this point is referred to as full hedge (see e.g. Wahl, Broll,
2000).
Using the modified capital adequacy regulation, one can derive the bank’s first–
order necessary conditions as
−D(rD)
D′(rD)
− rD + r − CD(D,L) = 0 (21)
(1− θ¯)
(
L(rL)
L′(rL)
+ rL
)
− (r + θ¯)− CL(D,L)
+(r − rK)K ′(δf(L(rL)−H))δf ′(L(rL)−H) = 0 (22)
(r − rK)K ′(δf(L(rL)−H))δf ′(L(rL)−H) = 0 (23)
As in the previous cases conditions (21) and (22) define the optimal deposit and loan
rates, respectively, whereas condition (23) concerns the optimal hedging volume.
To determine the optimal interest rates, we first have a look at (21) and (22).
Comparing (21) to the corresponding conditions in the previous sections, we recog-
nize that the first–order condition for the optimal deposit rate remains the same.
Thus rD is unaffected by regulation and hedging. As for the optimal loan rate we
first replace (r − rK)K ′(δf(L(rL) − H))δf ′(L(rL) − H) in (22) by the first–order
condition (23) for the optimal hedging decision to yield
(1− θ¯)
(
L(rL)
L′(rL)
+ rL
)
− (r + θ¯)− CL(D,L) = 0.
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Inspection of this equation shows equivalence to the first–order necessary condition
(6) for the optimal loan rate in the case without capital adequacy regulation. There-
fore, we can state that as a consequence of optimal hedging the bank’s optimal loan
rate is the same as without regulation.
The optimum hedging level is given by equation (23). From our previous assump-
tions we know (r − rK) < 0, K ′(δf(L(rL)−H)) > 0 and δ > 0. Thus for equation
(23) to hold it is necessary that f ′(L(rL) − H) = 0 which is true if and only if
L(rL) = H given our assumptions on f . Thus the bank fully hedges its exposure to
risk. This leads us to our
Proposition 4 When unbiased hedging is available, the risk neutral bank under
capital adequacy regulation of the Basel II type sets deposit and loan rates equal to
the levels prevailing without regulation.
Our analysis shows that a full hedge will be optimal, if the regulatory function
f has the properties suggested by paragraph 90 of Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2001a). Furthermore, our results exhibit the separation property well–
known from the literature, i.e., the bank can separate its production decision on rD
and rL from its risk management decision on H.
There is still one open question: Is hedging in the bank’s interest? Or, in other
words, is it beneficial for the bank to hedge? To answer this question we differentiate
the bank’s objective function (15) with respect to the hedging volume H and use
the envelope theorem to arrive at
dE(Π˜)
dH
= −(r − rK)K ′(δf(L(rL)−H))δf ′(L(rL)−H)). (24)
We know from our assumptions that (r − rK) < 0, K ′(δf(L(rL) − H)) > 0 and
δ > 0. Hence the sign of (24) only depends on the sign of f ′(L(rL) − H). There
are now two cases to be distinguished. First, when H < L(rL), i.e., when the bank
performs an under–hedge, we get f ′(L(rL) − H) > 0. Thus in this case the sign
of (24) is unambiguously positive. An increase in the hedging volume increases
expected profits. Second, when H > L(rL), i.e., when the bank over–hedges, we get
f ′(L(rL) − H) < 0. Hence in this case the sign of (24) is negative. An increase in
the volume of hedging lowers expected profits.
The intuition of this result is straightforward. When the bank under–hedges
(H < L(rL)), its profit is still subject to risk. That is why the regulatory rules
force the bank to use more equity which in turn causes costs to the bank. Raising
the hedging volume reduces the exposure to risk — until at L(rL) = H profits
are riskless — which in turn decreases the costs of capital hence raising expected
profits. However, when the bank over–hedges (H > L(rL)), profit is risky, too. Here
the risk arises because the bank may have to hand over some of its (fully hedged)
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revenue from the loan business to the contracting party in the market for credit
derivatives. In this case raising the hedging volume increases risk, and thereby due
to the regulation the cost of equity capital also increases. Thus in this situation
expected profit only increases when hedging is reduced and hence risk decreases.
5 Conclusion
Regulation of banks aims at increasing the safety of the banking sector. One of
the most important instruments is a capital adequacy regulation which relates a
bank’s equity to its exposure to risk on the asset side of the balance sheet. In this
paper we used an industrial organization approach to model a large risk neutral
bank in order to investigate consequences of this kind of regulation. We found that
a capital adequacy regulation of the type included both in the existing Basel Capital
Accord and in the proposed New Basel Capital Accord induces a risk neutral bank
to behave as if it were risk averse. This is caused by an income effect from linking
the bank’s exposure to risk to the equity capital required for performing banking
activities. The only necessary condition for this mechanism to work is that holding
and extending equity is more costly than the risk free interest rate in the (interbank)
capital market.
Furthermore it was shown that because of this effect of capital adequacy regu-
lation there exists an incentive for banks to engage in active risk management, i.e.,
hedging, if regulatory rules accept such hedging operations as risk reducing which
part of the proposal of the New Basel Capital Accord. In this case the banks fully
hedge their exposure to risk and can separate decisions on interest rates from hedg-
ing decisions. Otherwise hedging is not beneficial for banks and thus there is no
need for performing such activities. Looking back at our model we frankly admit
that life was made considerably easier by our assumptions on the operational costs
of banking. However, we are convinced that the substance of the argument would
not change with a more general specification of the cost function. If we had included
a positive cross–derivative in the cost function — i.e., a sufficient condition for dis-
economies of scope between the deposit business and the loan business of the bank
—, our case would have been strengthened. A negative cross–derivative — indicat-
ing economies of scope — would weaken our case, but only reverse our results for
sufficiently strong economies of scope. A similar point can be made with respect to
economies of scale.
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